Abstract. Betting strategies are often expressed formally as martingales. A martingale is called integer-valued if each bet must be an integer value. Integer-valued strategies correspond to the fact that in most betting situations, there is a minimum amount that a player can bet. According to a well known paradigm, algorithmic randomness can be founded on the notion of betting strategies. A real X is called integer-valued random if no effective integer-valued martingale succeeds on X. It turns out that this notion of randomness has interesting interactions with genericity and the computably enumerable degrees. We investigate the computational power of the integer-valued random reals in terms of standard notions from computability theory.
Introduction
An interesting strategy for someone who wishes to make a profit by betting on the outcomes of a series of unbiased coin tosses, is to double the the amount he bets each time he places a bet. Then, independently of whether he bets on heads or tails, if the coin is fair (i.e. the sequence of binary outcomes is random) he is guaranteed to win infinitely many bets. Furthermore, each time he wins he recovers all previous losses, plus he wins a profit equal to the original stake. This is a simple example from a class of betting strategies that originated from, and were popular in 18th century France. They are known as martingales. The "success" of this strategy is essentially equivalent to the fact that a symmetric one-dimensional random walk will eventually travel an arbitrarily long distance to the right of the starting point (as well as an arbitrarily long distance to the left of the starting point).
So what is the catch? For such a strategy to be maintained, the player needs to be able to withstand arbitrarily large losses, and such a requirement is not practically feasible. In terms of the random walk, this corresponds to the fact that, before it travels a large distance to the right of the starting point, it is likely to have travelled a considerable distance to the left of it.
1.1. Martingales and randomness. Martingales have been reincarnated in probability theory (largely though the work of Doob), as (memoryless) stochastic processes (Z n ) such that the conditional expectation of each Z n+1 given Z n remains equal to the expectation of Z 0 . The above observations on a fair coin-tossing game are now theorems in the theory of martingales. For example, Doob's maximal martingale inequality says that with probability 1, a non-negative martingale is bounded. Intuitively this means that, if someone is not able (or willing) to take credit (so that he continues to bet after his balance is negative) then the probability that he makes an arbitrarily large amount in profit is 0.
Martingales in probability rest on a concept of randomness in order to determine (e.g. with high probability) or explain the outcomes of stochastic processes. In turns out that this methodology can be turned upside down, so that certain processes are used in order to define or explain the concept of randomness. Such an approach was initiated by Schnorr in [Sch71] , and turned out to be one of the standard and most intuitive methods of assigning meaning to the concept of randomness for an individual string or a real (i.e. an infinite binary sequence, a point in the Cantor space). This approach is often known as the unpredictability paradigm, and it says that it should not be possible for a computable predictor to be able to predict bit n + 1 of a real X based on knowledge of bits 1, . . . , n of X, namely X ↾ n. The unpredictability paradigm can be formalized by using martingales, which (for our purposes) can be seen as betting strategies. We may define a martingale to be a function f : 2 <ω → R 0 which obeys the following fairness condition:
If f is partial, but its domain is downward closed with respect to the prefix relation on finite strings, then we say that f is a partial martingale. In probability terms, f can be seen as a stochastic process (a series of dependent variables) Z s where Z s represents the capital of a player at the end of the sth bet (where there is 50% chance for head or tails). Then the fairness condition says that the expectation of f at stage s + 1 is the same as the value of f at stage s. In other words, the fairness condition says that the expected growth of f at each stage of this game is 0. If we interpret f as the capital of a player who bets on the outcomes of the coin tosses, the fairness condition says that there is no bias in this game toward the player or the house. Moreover note that our definition of a martingale as a betting strategy requires that it is non-negative. Recalling our previous discussion about gambling systems, this means that we do not allow the player to have a negative balance. This choice in the definition is essential, as it prevents the success of a 'martingale betting system' as we described it. Continuing with our definition of martingales as betting strategies, we say that f succeeds on a real X if lim sup n→∞ f (X ↾ n) = ∞.
Schnorr [Sch71] was interested in an algorithmic concept of randomness. Incidentally, Martin-Löf [ML66] had already provided a mathematical definition of randomness based on computability theory and effective measure theory. But Schnorr wanted to approach this challenge via the intuitive concept of betting strategies. He proved that a real (i.e. an infinite binary sequence) X is Martin-Löf random if and only if no effective martingale can succeed on it. Here "effective" means that f is computably approximable from below. Schnorr's result is an effective version of the maximal inequality for martingales in probability theory, which says that with probability 1 a nonnegative martingale is bounded. There is a huge literature about the relationship between martingales and effective randomness, and variations on the theme, such as computable martingales and randomness, partial computable martingales, nonmonotonic martingales, polynomial time martingales, etc. We refer the reader to Downey and Hirschfeldt [DH10] and Nies [Nie09] for some details and further background.
Why integer-valued martingales?
Recall the standard criticism of martingale betting systems, i.e. that their success depends on the ability of the player to sustain arbitrarily large losses. This criticism lead (for the purpose of founding algorithmic randomness) to defining a martingale as a function from the space of coin-tosses to the non-negative reals (instead of all the reals) which represent the possible values of the capital available to the player. There is another criticism on such betting strategies that was not taken into account in the formal definition. Schnorr's definition of a martingale (as a betting strategy) allows betting infinitesimal (i.e. arbitrarily small) amounts. Clearly such an option is not available in real gambling situations, say at a casino, where you cannot bet arbitrarily small amounts on some outcome. It becomes evident that restricting the betting strategies to a discrete range results in a more realistic concept of betting. Such considerations led Bienvenu, Stephan and Teutsch [BST12] to introduce and study integer-valued martingales, and the corresponding randomness notions. Interestingly, it turns out that the algorithmic randomness based on integer-valued martingales is quite different from the theory of randomness based on Martin-Löf [ML66] or Schnorr [Sch71] (as developed in the last 30 years, see [DH10, Nie09] for an overview). The reason for this difference is that most of the classical martingale arguments in algorithmic randomness make substantial use of the property of being able to bet infinitesimal amounts (thereby effectively avoiding bankruptcy at any finite stage of the process).
Quite aside from the motivations of examining the concept of integer-valued martingales for its own sake, if we are to examine the randomness that occurs in practice, then such discretised randomness will be the kind we would get. The reason is evident: we can only use a finite number of rationals for our bets, and these scale to give integer values. Additionally, at the more speculative level, if the universe is granular, finite, and not a manifold, then if there is any randomness to be had (such as in quantum mechanics) it will be integer-valued for the same reason.
1.3. Integer randomness notions and computability. We formally introduce and discuss the notions of integervalued randomness in the context of computability theory. For the purposes of narrative flow, we will assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of algorithmic randomness. Schnorr based algorithmic randomness on the concept of effective strategies. Along with this foundational work, he introduced and philosophically argued for a randomness notion which is weaker than Martin-Löf randomness and is now known as Schnorr randomness.
Further notions, like computable randomness, are quite natural from the point of view of betting strategies and have been investigated extensively. Integer-valued martingales induce randomness notions with properties that are quite a different in flavour from those of, for instance, Martin-Löf randomness, computable randomness and the like. Our goal in the present paper is to clarify the relationship between integer-valued randomness and classical degree classes which measure levels of computational power.
Definition 1.1 (Integer-valued martingales). Given a finite set F ⊆ N, we say that a martingale f is F-valued if f (σi) = f (σ) ± k for some k ∈ F. A martingale is integer-valued if it is N-valued, and is single-valued if F = {a, 0}
for some a 0.
Note that a martingale is F-valued if at any stage we can only bet k dollars for some k ∈ F on one of the outcomes i ∈ {0, 1}, and must lose k dollars if 1 − i is the next bit. We note that partial integer-valued martingales are defined as in Definition 1.1, only that the martingales can be partial. In the following we often say that, given a string σ, the string σ0 is the sibling of σ1 (and σ1 is the sibling of σ0).
If we restrict our attention to the countable class of computable or partial computable martingales, we obtain a number of algorithmic randomness notions. For example, a real is [partial] computably random if no [partial] computable martingale succeeds on it. Similar notions are obtained if we consider integer-valued martingales.
Definition 1.2 (Integer-valued randomness). A real X is [partial] integer-valued random if no [partial] computable integer-valued martingale succeeds on it. Moreover X is finitely-valued random if for each finite set F ⊆ N, no computable F-valued martingale succeeds on it, and is single-valued random if no computable single-valued martingale succeeds on it.
We list these randomness notions in Table 1 , along with the traditional randomness notions computable and partial computable randomness. Note that partial integer-valued randomness is stronger than integer-valued randomness, just as partial computable randomness is stronger than computable randomness. Bienvenu, Stephan and Teutsch [BST12] clarified the relationship between integer-valued, single-valued and a number of other natural randomness notions. Figure 1 illustrates some of the implications that they obtained. We already know (see [DH10] ) that computable randomness implies Schnorr randomness, which in turn implies Kurtz randomness (with no reversals) and that Schnorr randomness implies the law of large numbers. Bienvenu, Stephan and Teutsch proved that if we add the above notions to the diagram in Figure 1 , no other implications hold apart from the ones in the diagram and the ones just mentioned. In addition, we may add a node for 'partial computably random' and an arrow from it leading to the node 'computably random'. Nies showed in [Nie09, Theorem 7.5.7] that the converse implication does not hold, i.e. there are computably random reals which are not partial computably random. A strong version of this fact holds for integer-valued randomness. We show that there are integer-valued random reals which not only are not partial integer-valued random, but they do not contain any partial integer-valued random reals in their Turing degree. One interesting observation of Bienvenu, Stephan and Teutsch [BST12] , was that integer-valued was a meeting point of genericity (and hence category) and measure since weakly 2-generic sets are integer-valued random. Hence the integer-valued randoms are co-meager as well as having measure 1. The reader should recall that a subset of N is called n-generic if it meets or avoids all Σ 0 n sets of strings, and is weakly n-generic if it meets all dense Σ 0 n sets of strings. The reason that highly generic reals are integer-valued random is that there is a finitary strategy to make a set integer-valued random, since we can force an opponent who bets to lose. The point here is that if the minimum bet is one dollar and he has k dollars to spend, then he can lose at most k times, so we can use a finite strategy to force the opponent into a cone (in Cantor space) where he cannot win. This finite strategy is not available if arbitrarily small bets are allowed. Naturally the question arises as to what level of genericity is needed for constructing integer-valued randoms. Bienvenu, Stephan and Teutsch [BST12] proved that it is possible to have a 1-generic which was not integer-valued random. So the answer they gave to this question is 'somewhere between weak 2 and 1-genericity'. As we see in the next section, we give a more precise answer.
1.4. Our results, in context. Bienvenu, Stephan and Teutsch [BST12] showed that the class of integer-valued random is co-meager, so sufficient genericity is a guarantee for this kind of randomness. They also quantified this statement via the hierarchy of genericity, showing that the genericity required lies somewhere between weak 2-genericity and 1-genericity. We show that a notion of genericity from [DJS96] which is known as pb-genericity, implies (partial) integer-valued randomness. Recall from [DJS96] that set of strings S is pb-dense if it contains the range of a function f : 2 <ω → 2 <ω with a computable approximation ( f s ) such that f (σ) σ for all strings σ and |{s | f s+1 (σ) f s (σ)}| h(σ) where the function h : 2 <ω → ω is primitive recursive. A real X is pb-generic if every pb-dense set of strings contains a prefix of X.
Theorem 1.3 (Genericity for integer-valued randoms). Every pb-generic real is (partial) integer-valued random.
This result might suggest that integer-valued randomness and partial integer-valued randomness are not easily distinguishable. In Section 2.2 we present a rather elaborate finite injury construction of a real which is integervalued random but not partial integer-valued random. In Section 2.3 this construction is modified into a 0 ′′ tree argument, which proves the following degree separation between the two randomness notions.
Theorem 1.4 (Degree separation of randomness notions).
There exists an integer-valued random X < T 0 ′ which does not compute any partial integer-valued random.
We are interested in classifying the computational power that is associated with integer-valued randomness. Computational power is often represented by properties of degrees, which in turn define classes like the degrees which can solve the halting problem, or the array non-computable degrees from [DJS96] . The reader might recall that A is array noncomputable if and only if for all f ≤ wtt ∅ ′ , there is a function g ≤ T A such that g(n) > f (n) for infinitely many n. This class has turned out to be ubiquitous and characterized classes defined by many distinct combinatorial properties. Recall that a presentation of a real A is a c.e. prefix-free set of strings representing an open set of Lebesgue measure α. The c.e. array noncomputable degrees are exactly the c.e. degrees that (a) contain c.e. sets A of infinitely often maximal (i.e. 2 log n) Kolmogorov complexity; (Kummer [Kum96] Note however that an integer-valued random need not be of array noncomputable degree. Indeed, it is well known that there are array computable Martin-Löf randoms. A converse of Corollary 1.5 can be obtained for the c.e. degrees, as Theorem 1.7 shows.
While genericity is an effective tool for exhibiting integer-valued randomness in the global structure of the degrees (as we demonstrated above) it is incompatible with computable enumerability. Since generic degrees (even 1-generic) are not c.e., investigating integer-valued randomness in the c.e. degrees requires a different analysis. Already the fact that randomness can be exhibited in the c.e. degrees is quite a remarkable phenomenon, and restricted to weak versions of randomness. Martin-Löf randomness is the strongest standard randomness notion that can be found in the c.e. degrees. A c.e. degree contains a Martin-Löf random set if and only if it is complete (i.e. it is the degree of the halting problem). Furthermore, the complete c.e. degree contains the most well-known random sequence-Chaitin's Ω-which is the measure of the domain of a universal prefix-free machine, the universal halting probability. An interesting characteristic of this random number is that it is left-c.e., i.e. it can be approximated by a computable increasing sequence of rationals. Weaker forms of randomness-like computable and Schnorr randomness-can be found in incomplete c.e. degrees, even in the form of left-c.e. sets. For example, Nies, Stephan and Terwijn [NST05] showed that the c.e. degrees which contain computably and Schnorr random sets are exactly the high c.e. degrees. Moreover each high c.e. degree contains a computably random left-c.e. set and a Schnorr random left-c.e. set. We prove an analogous result for integer-valued randomness and partial integer-valued randomness.
Theorem 1.6 (C.e. degrees containing integer-valued random left-c.e. sets). A c.e. degree contains a (partial) left-c.e. integer-valued random if and only if it is high.
This result is pleasing, but this is where the similarities between computable randomness (based on computable betting strategies) and integer-valued randomness (based on integer-valued computable betting strategies) end, at least with respect to the c.e. degrees. We note that
In the c.e. degrees, the following classes are equal to the high degrees:
(i) degrees containing computably random sets; (ii) degrees containing left-c.e. computably random sets; (iii) degrees computing computably random sets.
This characterization follows from the following facts, where (a) is by Schnorr [Sch71] , (c) was first observed by Kučera [Kuč85] , and (b), (d) are from [NST05] .
(a) computable randomness implies Schnorr randomness; (b) a Schnorr random which does not have high degree is Martin-Löf random; (c) a Martin-Löf random of c.e. degree is complete; (d) every high c.e. degree contains a computably random left-c.e. set. In the case of integer-valued randomness (1.1) fails significantly. In particular, the c.e. degrees that compute integer-valued randoms are not the same as the c.e. degrees that contain integer-valued randoms. In fact, we provide the following characterization of the c.e. degrees that compute integer-valued randoms. Theorem 1.7 (C.e. degrees computing integer-valued randoms). A c.e. degree computes an integer-valued random if and only if it is array noncomputable.
In view of this result it is tempting to think that that every c.e. array noncomputable might contain an integer-valued random. We will see however in Section 5.1 that there are array noncomputable c.e. degrees which do not contain integer-valued randoms. In fact, Theorem 1.8 is an extreme version of this fact, which is tight with respect to the jump hierarchy.
We have seen that high c.e. degrees are powerful enough to contain integer-valued randoms, even left-c.e. integer-valued randoms. However, while we know that left-c.e. integer-valued randoms necessarily have high degree, the question arises as to whether a weaker jump class is sufficient to guarantee that a c.e. degree contains an integer-valued random, if we no longer require that the set is left-c.e. We give a negative answer to this question by the following result, which we prove in Section 5.2 by a 0 ′′′ -argument. Note that this result shows the existence of array noncomputable c.e. degrees which do not contain integer-valued randoms, in stark contrast to Theorem 1.7. Furthermore, the c.e. degrees that contain integer-valued randoms are not the same as the c.e. degrees that contain left-c.e. integer-valued randoms. In fact, in stark contrast with Theorem 1.6, there exists a low c.e. degree containing an integer-valued random set. More generally, we can find c.e. degrees containing integer-valued random sets in every jump class. Section 4 is devoted to the proof of this result. There are a number of open questions and research directions pointed by the work in this paper. For example, is there a c.e. degree which contains an integer-valued random but does not contain any partial integer-valued randoms? More generally, which degrees contain partial computable randoms? Algorithmic randomness based on partial martingales is a notion that remains to be explored on a deeper level.
Genericity and partial integer-valued randoms
Bienvenu, Stephan, Teutsch [BST12, Theorem 8] showed that every weakly 2-generic set is integer-valued random. In Section 2.1 we give a proof of Theorem 1.3, i.e. that pb-genericity is sufficient for (partial) integervalued randomness.
Hence a certain notion of genericity (pb-genericity) is a source of integer-valued randomness. In fact, by Theorem 1.3, every pb-generic is not only integer-valued random but also partial integer-valued random. We do not have concrete examples of reals that are integer-valued random but not partial integer-valued random. Section 2.2 is dedicated to constructing such an example. We give the basic construction of a ∆ 0 2 real which is integervalued random but not partial integer-valued random. We give this in full detail, as it is based on an interesting idea.
In Section 2.3 we provide the necessary modification of the previous construction in order to show that the degrees of integer-valued randoms and partial integer-valued randoms can also be separated, even inside ∆ 0 2 . In particular, we are going to prove Theorem 1.4, i.e. that there is a ∆ 0 2 integer-valued random which does not compute any partial integer-valued randoms. These modifications are essentially the implementation of the main argument of Section 2.2 on a tree, which results from the additional requirements that introduce infinitary outcomes that need to be guessed (i.e. the totality of the various functionals with oracle the constructed set). Given the original strategies and construction, the tree argument is fairly standard. 2.
2. An integer-valued random which is not partial integer-valued random. It suffices to construct an integervalued random set A ≤ T ∅ ′ and a partial integer-valued martingale m which succeeds on A. We will define a computable approximation (A s ) which converges to a set A which has the required properties. Let n e e∈ω be an effective list of all partial computable integer-valued martingales. For each e 2 we need to satisfy the requirements R e : If n e is total, then n e does not succeed on A. Q e : m wins (at least) $e on A. We first see how we might meet one requirement R 0 . We begin by setting A 0 = 1 ω and defining m to start with $2 and wager $1 on every initial segment of A 0 . If we later see that n 0 has increased its capital along A 0 , then we would like to move our approximation to A so that n 0 decreases in capital. In changing A s to decrease n 0 's capital we may also decrease m's capital along A s . If n e had, say, $10 in capital at some point, then as it loses at least a dollar every time it decreases in capital, it can lose at most 10 times. Our martingale, if it bets in $1 wagers, can withstand losing $10 only if its capital at that point is at least $11.
If m does not have sufficient capital for us to start attacking immediately, we must find a way to increase its capital. We can increase m's capital to $k as follows. We have not yet defined m on any string extending 0. We therefore wait until n 0 has halted on all strings of length k. If this never happens, then n 0 is not total, and R 0 is met. If n 0 does halt on all strings of length k, we pick a string τ of length k extending 0 such that n 0 (τ) n 0 (0). Such a string must exist since n 0 is a (partial) martingale. We are then free to define m to wager $1 on every initial segment of τ and set A s = τˆ1 ω . We will then have m(τ) > n 0 (τ). If n 0 later increases its capital along A s we will be able to change the approximation to A to decrease n 0 's capital. As m now has greater capital than n 0 , we will be able to decrease n 0 's capital to $0 while ensuring that m does not run out of money.
When dealing with multiple requirements, we must take care in defining m as it is a global object. We set a restraint r e for every e ∈ ω. We arrange things so that only R e will be able to define m on a string extending A s ↾ r e,sˆ0 . Suppose R e has not required attention since it was last injured. When we see n e increase its capital above n e (A s ↾ r e ), rather than starting to attack immediately, even if possible, we choose a string τ ′ extending A s ↾ r e,sˆ0 and define m such that m(τ ′ ) − m(A s ↾ r e,sˆ0 ) > n e (A s ↾ r e,sˆ0 ). We injure requirements of weaker priority by lifting their restraints. We may then decrease n e 's capital to $0 and still have m left with some capital. We now turn to the formal details of the construction.
We have for every requirement R e a restraint r e . At every stage a requirement will either be declared to be waiting for convergence at some length, or declared to not be waiting for convergence at any length. As usual, this will stay in effect at the next stage unless otherwise mentioned. We say that R e requires attention at stage s if either (i) R e was declared to not be waiting for convergence at any length at stage s, and there is l such that (a) l > r e,s , (b) n e,s (σ) ↓ for all strings σ of length l, and (c) n e (A s ↾ l) > n e (A s ↾ (l − 1)), or (ii) R e was declared to be waiting for convergence at length h at stage s, and n e,s (σ) ↓ for all strings σ of length h. In Case (i) we say that R e requires attention through l. We say that Q e requires attention at stage s if m(A s ↾ r e,s ) < e. We order the requirements as R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , Q 2 , R 3 , Q 3 , . . . .
Construction. Stage 0:
Set A 0 = 1 ω and m(λ) = 2, and let m wager $1 on every initial segment of A 0 . Set r e,0 = e for all e ∈ ω. For all e ∈ ω, declare that R e is not waiting for convergence at any length at stage 1. Verification. Before we demonstrate the satisfaction of requirements R e , Q e , we need to show that the partial martingale m is well-defined, and for all n, s ∈ ω, By the definition of A 0 and m at stage 0, we have m(A 0 ↾ n) 2 for all n. Furthermore, m is at least 1 on the sibling of any initial segment of A 0 (recall the definition of the sibling of a string, just after Definition 1.1). Suppose that m(A s ↾ n) 1 for all n and m is at least 1 for any sibling of an initial segment of A s . If we act for Q e at stage s, then it is easy to see that m(A s+1 ↾ n) 1 for all n. So suppose that we act for R e at stage s. If we act in Case 2 for R e at stage s, then we will choose a string τ extending A s ↾ r e,sˆ0 of some length h. By assumption, m(A s ↾ r e,sˆ0 ) 1. We then let A s+1 extend τ and define m such that m(τ) − m(A s ↾ r e,sˆ0 ) > n e (A s ↾ r e,sˆ0 ). Then m(A s+1 ↾ n) 1 for all n. Now suppose that we act for R e in Subcase 1b through length l at stage s. Our martingale m wagers at most $1 at a time, and so loses at most $1 at a time. We decrease n e by at least $1 while decreasing m by at most $1. As m(A s ↾ l) > n e (A s ↾ (l − 1)), we may reduce n e 's capital to $0 while m has capital remaining. Now requirements of stronger priority than R e may start to act. Suppose that R e ′ with e ′ < e requires attention. If R e ′ requires attention in Case (ii) then we will act as in the previous paragraph and m will still have capital left. Otherwise, R e ′ may act in Subcase 1b at stage t after having acted in Case 2 before stage s. However, in this case, we would have increased m's capital by n e ′ (A s ↾ r e ′ ,sˆ0 ) previously. Therefore, after having reduced n e 's capital to 0, we may then reduce n e ′ 's capital to 0 as well, while ensuring that m still has capital remaining. This concludes the induction on the stages and the proof of (2.1).
Note that we have not yet shown that the approximation (A s ) converges to a set A. This is a consequence of the use of restraints in the construction, and the following lemma which says that each requirement R e receives attention only finitely often.
Lemma 2.1. For all e ∈ ω, R e receives attention only finitely often, and is met.
Proof. Suppose by induction that s * − 1 is the last stage at which R e is injured (i.e. the least stage after which no requirement of stronger priority than R e receives attention). If R e never requires attention at some later stage in Case (i), then either n e is not total, or n e (A) n e (A s * ↾ r e,s * ). In either case R e is met. Therefore suppose that R e requires attention through l at some stage s ′ s * . We will act in Subcase 1a and declare R e to be waiting for convergence at length n e ((A s ′ ↾ r e,s ′ )ˆ0) + 1 + (r e,s ′ + 1) =: h 0 . As no requirement R e ′ for e ′ < e receives attention after stage s * , R e will be waiting for convergence at length h 0 until, if ever, R e requires attention in Case (ii). If R e never requires attention after stage s ′ then n e is not total. So suppose that R e requires attention in Case (ii) at stage t ′ . We choose a string τ of length h 0 above A t ′ ↾ r eˆ0 such that n e (τ) n e (A t ′ ↾ r eˆ0 ). Since n e is a (partial) martingale, n e (σ) n e (A t ′ ↾ r eˆ0 ) for at least one string σ of length h 0 above A t ′ ↾ r eˆ0 . Therefore such a string must exist.
We set A t ′ +1 = τˆ1 ω and define m so that m(τ) > n e (τ). If R e receives attention after stage t ′ then it must do so in Subcase 1b. Our martingale m wagers at most $1 at a time, and so loses at most $1 at a time. If R e requires attention through some l > h 0 at a stage t ′′ > t ′ then we will again act in Subcase 1b and force n e to lose at least $1 while m loses at most $1. This can happen at most n e (τ) many times before n e loses all its capital and can no longer bet. Thus the induction can continue, and R e is met.
It remains to show that m succeeds on A. For this, it suffices to show that all requirements Q e , e 2 are met.
Lemma 2.2. For all e 2, Q e receives attention only finitely often, and is met.
Proof. Suppose by induction that s * is the least stage after which no requirement of stronger priority than Q e receives attention. As no requirement of stronger priority than Q e receives attention after stage s * , the restraint r e,s * will never again be increased unless Q e acts. If Q e requires attention at stage s > s * then we must have m(A s ↾ r e,s ) < e. As no requirement of stronger priority receives attention after stage s * , we must have that Q e−1 is satisfied, and so m(A s ↾ r e,s ) = e − 1. We have defined m to wager $1 on all initial segments of A s and so there is τ such that m(τ) = e. We let A s+1 = τˆ1 ω and increase the restraints r e ′ ,s+1 for all e ′ e. We then have that τ ≺ A and Q e is satisfied.
2.3. Integer-valued randoms not computing partial integer-valued randoms. The construction of Section 2.2, non-trivial as it is, admits some modifications. For example, it is not hard to add the requirement that A is 1-generic and still successfully perform the argument. This requirement can be canonically split into an infinite sequence of conditions, with corresponding strategies in the constructions which will occasionally change the approximation to A. Since the 1-genericity sub-requirements are finitary, their effect will be similar to (in fact, more benign than) the R e requirements.
There is a 1-generic integer-valued random which is not partial integer-valued random.
Note that 1-generics are generalized low, so since A is ∆ 0 2 , it follows that There is a low integer-valued random which is not partial integer-valued random. Requirements Q * e,k act as the Q k of Section 2.2 while R e are the same in the two constructions. Moreover these two requirements have a single outcome in the tree argument. The crucial point here is that if Φ A e is total and non-computable then Φ e will have splitting along A, i.e. for each prefix τ of A there will be two finite extensions τ i of τ and an argument x such that Φ
e (x). This means that before strategy Q * e,k starts operating, it can secure a splitting which it can use to move away from versions of Φ A e on which m has not bet appropriately. In the construction of Section 2.2 this happened automatically as m bet on the real itself, and not its image under a Turing functional. Other than these points, the construction and verification is entirely similar to that of Section 2.2. Since this there is no novelty in this extension of the argument of Section 2.2 (given the standard machinery for tree arguments and the above remarks) we leave the remaining details to the motivated reader.
Computable enumerability and integer-valued randomness
Nies, Stephan and Terwijn [NST05] showed that a c.e. degree is high if and only if it contains a computably random c.e. real. Moreover an analogous statement holds for partial computable random c.e. reals. In Section 3.1 we show that the same is true for integer-valued random c.e. reals. In other words, we give the proof of the first part of Theorem 1.6 that we discussed in the introduction. The proof of the remaining part of Theorem 1.6 (regarding partial integer-valued randoms) is deferred to Section 4.3, since the required machinery is similar to the one we use for the jump inversion theorems. In Section 3.2 we give the proof of Theorem 1.7. Note that by Corollary 1.5, for this proof it suffices to show that array computable c.e. degrees are not integer-valued random.
3.1. Degrees of left-c.e. integer-valued randoms. In this section we prove the first part of Theorem 1.6, i.e. that the high c.e. degrees are exactly those c.e. degrees which contain integer-valued random left-c.e. reals. The 'if' direction is a consequence of [NST05] . For the 'only if' direction it suffices to show that every integer-valued random left-c.e. real has high degree. Let α be an integer-valued random left-c.e. real, and α s s<ω a computable increasing sequence of rationals converging to α. We may assume that α has infinitely many 1s, and so by speeding up the enumeration we may ensure that α s has at least s 1's. Let Tot = {e | ϕ e is total} be the canonical Π 0 2 complete set. We build a Turing functional Γ such that for all e, lim k Γ α (e, k) = Tot(e). Then ∅ ′′ T α ′ and so α is high. We also construct for each e ∈ ω a computable integer-valued martingale M e . Let
We proceed in stages s, each consisting of two steps. 
Construction at stage
, and the position of the first 1 of α t after α t ↾ d e,t . Let h be the position of the first 1 in 
Hence given an integer-valued random B and a c.e. set A such that B ≤ T A, it suffices to define an order function h and a function f ≤ T A such that any computable approximation ( f [s]) to f does not satisfy (3.1). Let B be integer-valued random and suppose A is c.e. and Γ A = B. We assume that at stage s, Γ has computed s many bits of
We define an order function h and a Turing functional ∆ such that the function f = ∆ A does not satisfy (3.1) for any computable approximation ( f [s]) of it. Let ψ e be an effective list of all binary partial computable functions. We meet the requirements
. We define for each e ∈ ω an integer-valued martingale m e . First, let us describe the strategy for R 0 . We will have h(0) = 1. At stage 1 we define f (0) = 1 with use δ 1 (0) = γ 1 (0). We wait until a stage s where we see
If this happens, we will want to define m 0 to put pressure on A to change so that we may redefine f (0). We define m 0 to start with $1 in capital and wager $1 on Γ A [s] ↾ 1. If Γ A ↾ 1 changes then we get a change in A below γ 1 (0), and so a change in A below δ 1 (0). We may therefore redefine f (0) and so meet R 0 . We assume that there will be no change in Γ A ↾ 1, and so we immediately look to see whether we can start attacking R 0 again by trying to redefine f (1). At stage 2 we define f (1) = 2 with use δ 2 (1) = γ 2 (1). If we see no change in Γ A ↾ 1, then the martingale m 0 has $2 on Γ A ↾ 1. We will have h(1) = 1. We wait until a stage s ′ where we see
If this happens, we define m 0 to wager $1 on
If A changes below γ s ′ (1) then we may redefine f (1) and meet R 0 .
We would like m 0 to be total. Therefore whenever we let m 0 wager some of its capital on a string σ, we extend m 0 by letting it bet neutrally on all other strings of length at most |σ|. Now suppose that none of our previous attempts to redefine f (0), . . . , f (x − 1) have been successful. We wait until a stage s where we have ψ e (y, s) = f (y)[s] for all y x. The use δ s (x) will be equal to γ s (l) for some l. Suppose we have defined m 0 up to strings of length l − 1 and that m 0 has $k on Γ A ↾ (l − 1). Suppose h(x) = n. Then we require n changes in A to redefine f (x) as many times as we would like. If we let m 0 wager $1 on Γ A ↾ l and see A change below γ s (l), we can redefine f (x) once. Suppose that we see this change at stage t. We lift δ t (x) = γ t (l + 1). The martingale m 0 has been defined up to strings of length l, and we have m 0 (Γ A t ↾ l) = k − 1. We again wait until a stage t ′ where ψ e (y, t
If this occurs, we now define m 0 to wager $2 on Γ A t ′ ↾ (l + 1). We do this so that if we do not see a change in this instance, m 0 's capital becomes $k + 1. When we set
. Therefore, if necessary we may start attacking R 0 by trying to redefine f (x + 1). If every time we see a change for f (x) we increase our wager by $1, after n − 1 many changes we are left with $k − (1 + 2 + . . . + n − 1) = $k − 1 2 (n − 1)n. In attempting to get the nth change, we wager all remaining capital and require that if we do not see another change, then we end up with more than $k. So we want 2(k −
We therefore set h(0) = 1 and let h(n) be the greatest m such that (m − 1)m < h(n − 1) + 1. If we define m 0 as above then either we see all required changes, or m 0 's capital increases to at least k + 1. As B is integer-valued random, we eventually do see all changes to redefine some f (x), and satisfy R 0 .
Multiple requirements and interactions.
In order to to deal with multiple requirements, we proceed as follows. The function f = ∆ A is a global object which must be defined on all inputs. As in the strategy above, the values f (x) are changed by the action of the requirements. Suppose we satisfy R 0 by redefining f (0) once. We could attempt to satisfy R 1 by further redefining f (0), but at some point we must stop. We choose a fresh large number x 1 , and have the strategy for R 1 try to redefine f (x 1 ) as many times as necessary. As we saw above, the strategy for R 1 may at any one time be wanting to redefine f (y) for possibly many y. We formalise this by associating to each requirement R e at stage s an interval I e,s of natural numbers, so that R e at stage s is wanting to redefine f (x) for x ∈ I e,s . When we are successful in redefining x ∈ I e,s , we remove all y > x from I e,s . If we have not already satisfied R e at some later stage s ′ and we see ψ e (z, s
for all z x + 1, then we add x + 1 to I e,s ′ and attempt to redefine f (x + 1) as well.
Consider the requirements R e and R f , with R e of stronger priority than R f . We are defining martingales m e for R e and m f for R f . It is possible that when Γ A moves and we redefine some f (k) for the sake of R e that the martingale m f also loses capital, even though we do not redefine some f ( j) for the sake of R f . We will therefore want to start a new version of m f every time a requirement of stronger priority than R f acts. We say that R e requires attention at stage s if one of the following holds:
(1) I e,s = ∅.
(2) for all x max I e,s we have 
Let I e,1 = ∅ for all e ∈ ω. Each stage of the construction after stage 0 consists of three steps. At stage s, s 1 proceed as follows:
Step 1: For all e s, if a requirement of stronger priority than R e has acted since R e last acted, we start a new version of m e , and define m e (λ) = 1. Otherwise, we continue with the previous version of m e . Let d e,s denote the length of the longest string for which the current version of m e is defined.
Step 2: Let x be least such that f (x) is undefined at the beginning of stage s. (If there is no such x, proceed to the next step.) Let l = max e s d e,s . Define f (x)[s] = s + 1 with use δ s (x) = γ s (l + 1).
Step 3: Let R e be the requirement of strongest priority which requires attention at stage s. Choose the first case by which R e requires attention.
If case 1 holds, choose a fresh large number x e and let I e,s+1 = {x e }. If case 2 holds, then let x ∈ I e,s be least such that 
is redefined h(x) many times and R e is satisfied.
Jump inversion for integer-valued randoms
Jump inversion for Martin-Löf randoms was discovered in [Kuč85, DM06] and was generalized in [BDN11] . Every degree which is c.e. in and above 0 ′ contains the jump of some Martin-Löf random ∆ 0 2 set. Hence the same holds for the integer-valued randoms. However in this case we can obtain a stronger jump inversion theorem by requiring that the 'inverted' degrees are c.e. Note that this stronger theorem does not hold for Martin-Löf randoms since 0 ′ is the only c.e. degree containing a Martin-Löf random. Moreover it does not hold for computable randomness or Schnorr randomness, since by [NST05] the only c.e. degrees that contain such randoms are high. integer-valued randomness is the strongest known randomness notion for which jump inversion holds with c.e. degrees.
Since the argument is somewhat involved, we present it in two steps. In Section 4.1 we discuss the strategy for controlling the jump of an integer-valued random of c.e. degree. This argument gives a low c.e. degree which contains an integer-valued random. It is a finite injury construction, and the hardest of the two steps. Our argument actually shows the stronger result that there is a low c.e. weak truth table degree which contains an integer-valued random. We can then add coding requirements in order to prove the full jump inversion theorem, which we present in full detail in Section 4.2. This construction is a tree argument which uses the strategies of Section 4.1 for ensuring that the jump of the constructed set is below the given Σ 0 2 set, combined with standard coding requirements which deal with the remaining requirements.
4.1. A low c.e. degree containing an integer-valued random. We build an integer-valued random A of low c.e. degree. In fact, we build an integer-valued random A and a c.e. set B such that A ≡ wtt B. Let m e be an effective list of all partial integer-valued martingales. In order to ensure that A is integer-valued random it suffices to satisfy the following requirements: 
To record this change in B, we let A extend a string of length l i+2 which has not yet been visited. So that the reduction ∆ is consistent, we must not let A extend a string which is forbidden, that is, a string σ such that ∆ σ ⊀ B s+1 . We carefully define the levels l i so that the action from the requirements never forces us to extend a forbidden string.
Before we define l i i<ω and d i i<ω , we lay out the construction (in terms of these unspecified parameters and a function d defined below). In Section 4.1.2 we discuss the various properties that these parameters need to satisfy in order that the construction is successful (i.e. produces sets A, B which satisfy the requirements R e , N e ).
We 
Choose a string ρ of length l i+2 extending τ such that ρ ⊀ A t for all t < s, and the minimum of all d(ρ, µ), where the minimum is taken over forbidden strings µ of length l i+2 extending τ, is as large as possible. Figure 2 . Suppose that we act at level l i+1 for R e and naively let A extend a string τ of length l i+1 whose sibling is forbidden. Consider the situation where m 0 increases its capital on the very last bit of A s ↾ l i+1 , loses capital on τ, and is neutral on all other strings of length l i+1 . We will not be able to change A to extend τ's sibling, as this string is forbidden. However, we do not want to change A so that m 0 is neutral, as we would like the action for R 0 to be finitary. To avoid such a situation we must be more careful in how we change A. In particular, we must ensure that A is kept in some sense "far away" from forbidden strings. This is made precise below.
We first calculate an upper bound on the number of forbidden strings of length l i+1 which can occur above a nonforbidden string of length l i . Our upper bound will not be strict. A string σ of length l i+1 becomes forbidden if ∆ σ is no longer giving correct B-information. As δ(d i ) = l i+1 , ∆ σ will be incorrect only if we enumerate an element into B below d i , which occurs only when we act for a requirement at some level l i . We will act for R e at level l i+1 only when we see m e halt on all strings of length l i+1 , and so if A no longer changes below l i , we will act for R e at level l i+1 at most once. As we act at level l i+1 only for the sake of requirements R 0 , . . . , R i , if A no longer changes below l i , we can act at level l i+1 at most i + 1 times. After acting at a level l j for some j i, we allow R 0 , . . . , R i to act at level l i+1 again. We begin with A 1 = 1 ω . Suppose we act i + 1 times at level l i+1 . We then act at level l i . We act another i + 1 times at level l i+1 before we again act at level l i . We can act at level l i at most i times. This can continue until we get to level l 1 , where we can change A once below l 1 for the sake of requirement R 0 . Therefore we act at a level l i 2.3.4. . . . · (i + 2) = (i + 2)! many times, and there are at most
n m e (λ). We now show how a martingale can force us "closer" to a forbidden string. Suppose at stage s that A s extends the string ν of length l i+1 , and there is a forbidden string µ of length l i+2 above. For simplicity, suppose that A s extends the leftmost string of length l i+2 which extends ν, and that µ is the rightmost string of length l i+2 which extends ν. If R j requires attention at level l i+2 , we would like to choose a string τ of length l i+2 with m j (τ) < m j (ν). The problem is the following. Suppose that m j increases its capital on all string of length l i+2 which extend ν0. By Kolmogorov's inequality, this must mean that m j (ν0) > m j (ν), and so m j (ν1) < m j (ν). If m j has sufficient capital at ν1, it may then increase its capital above m j (ν) on all strings of length l i+2 which extend ν10. Again by Kolmogorov's inequality we have m j (ν10) > m j (ν1) and so m j (ν11) < m j (ν1) < m j (ν). Now m j is an integervalued martingale, and so after doing this finitely many times, say n times, we have m j (ν1 n ) < 1 2 m j (ν) and so m j cannot increase its capital above m j (ν) on all strings of length l i+2 which extend ν1 n 0. If l i+2 l i+1 + n + 1, then we can pick a string τ extending ν1 n 0 with m j (τ) < m j (ν) and which is not forbidden. For two strings α and β of length l, let d(α, β) be l − b, where b is the length of the longest common initial segment. Then in this situation, we have d(A s , µ) = l i+2 − l i+1 and d(τ, µ) l i+2 − l i+1 − n. Therefore m j has forced A distance n closer to the forbidden string µ. Now R j might not be the only requirement which can act at level l i+2 . We will then need to calculate the distance that the other martingales may move A, and ensure that l i+2 is high enough.
is not able to increase its capital to k + 1 on all strings extending ν1 n 0. We let n(k) = (µn)(k − 1 − 2 − . . . − 2 n−1 < 1 2 k). Then m can move A at most a distance n(k). In the case where A s is not the leftmost string extending ν and µ is not the rightmost string extending ν, a similar argument shows that m e can still move A a distance of at most n(k). The only difference is that m e would then need to bet against the initial segments of µ which are of length greater than
Suppose we act at level l i+1 at stage s and let A extend the string ν of length l i+1 which has forbidden strings of length l i+2 above. We enumerate an element of
To record this change in B, we choose a string ρ of length l i+2 which has not been visited before, and which is as far from any forbidden string as possible. We have that there are at most f i+2 many forbidden strings of length l i+2 above a nonforbidden string of length l i+1 . Let x = (µx)(2 x f i+2 ). By the counting argument for f i+1 given above, if l i+2 − l i+1 = h > x, then there is a string of length l i+2 which has not been visited yet, and which is at least distance h − x from a forbidden string. Now suppose that R j requires attention at level l i+2 . We know that there are no forbidden strings above ρ ↾ l i+1 + x + 1, and so if we can reduce m j by moving to a string which is still above ρ ↾ l i+1 + x + 1, we will do so. Otherwise, m j will move us closer to a forbidden string. The bound on the capital of m j at A s ↾ (l i+1 + x + 1) is 2 l i+1 +x+1 m j (λ). So we know that m j may move us a distance at most n(2 l i+1 +x+1 m j (λ)) towards a forbidden string. If l i+2 − l i+1 > x + n(2 l i+1 +x+1 m j (λ)) then we will be able to choose a nonforbidden string ρ ′ which decreases m j . Suppose that R k , which is of stronger priority than R j , requires attention at level l i+2 at stage s ′ . Our reasoning is similar to the previous case. Let n 0 = n(2 l i+1 +x+1 m j (λ)). We know that there are no forbidden strings above ρ ′ ↾ l i+1 + x + n 0 + 1, and so if we can reduce m k by moving to a string which is still above ρ ′ ↾ l i+1 + x + n 0 + 1, we will do so. Otherwise, m k will move us closer to a forbidden string. The bound on the capital of m k at
. So we know that m k may move us a distance at most n(2 l i+1 +x+n 0 +1 m k (λ)) towards a forbidden string. If l i+2 −l i+1 > x+n 0 +n(2 l i+1 +x+n 0 +1 m k (λ)) then we will be able to choose a nonforbidden string ρ ′′ which decreases m k . We will need l i+2 to be large enough so that we can always move in this way for any requirement which might act at level l i+2 .
The requirements R 0 , . . . , R i can act at level l i+1 . We do not know the order in which the requirements may act, so we will have to take the maximum of the capitals of the martingales m 0 , . . . , m i in our calculation. We illustrate this definition in Figure 2 . We set l 0 = 0. Given l i , we set l i+1,0 = l i + (µx)(2 For the other reduction, note that the consistency of ∆ is a consequence of A never extending a forbidden string. Again the uses δ(d i ) are computable and so ∆ A = B via the weak truth-table functional ∆. Next we argue that all N e requirements are met. Suppose inductively that all requirements of stronger priority than N e do not act after a certain stage t. If at some stage s after stage t the computation in requirement N e halts, then a restraint r e,s will be erected so that the use of the computation is protected from further enumerations into A. Therefore in that case the computation actually halts. Therefore N e is met, and this concludes the induction step.
It remains to show that for every e ∈ ω, R e is satisfied. Suppose by induction that all requirements of stronger priority than R e do not act after stage s * . Let i 0 be least such that l i 0 r e,s * . We show that m e (A) m e (A s * ↾ l i 0 ). Suppose at stage s s * we see m e increase its capital beyond m e (A s * ↾ l i 0 ). Then R e will require attention at stage s. Suppose that R e requires attention at level l i+1 at stage s. Let t < s be the last stage at which we acted for some requirement at a level below l i+1 . Suppose we acted at level l j+1 . At stage t we chose some string ρ of length l j+2 and let A t = ρ1 ω . Then A s−1 ↾ l i = A t ↾ l i . If j = i − 1 then we chose ρ which would have been at least distance l i+1 − l i − x, where x = (µx)(2 x f i+1 ), from any forbidden string of length l i+1 (that is, ρ and any forbidden string have a common initial segment of length at most l i + x). Otherwise j < i − 1 and there is no forbidden string of length l i+1 above A s ↾ l i . Suppose that between stages t and s − 1 inclusive we acted at level l i+1 k many times. We have that k < i+1. Then A s ↾ l i and any forbidden string have a common initial segment of length at most l i+1,k . Let l ∈ (l i , l i+1 ] be least such that m e (A s ↾ l) > m e (A s ↾ l i ). If l > l i+1,k + 1, then there is a string τ above A s ↾ l i+1,k + 1 with m e (τ) < m e (A s ↾ l) and which is not forbidden. Otherwise m e can move us at most distance n(2 l i+1,k +1 m e (λ)) closer to a forbidden string. We have that l i+1 > l i+1,k + n(2 l i+1,k +1 m e (λ)), so we can find a nonforbidden string τ with m e (τ) < m e (A s ↾ l). Restraints are then imposed so that R e and no other requirement of weaker priority may act at level l i+1 after stage s. Therefore A ↾ l i+1 = A s+1 ↾ l i+1 and so m e (A) < m e (A s * ↾ l i 0 ).
The full jump inversion theorem for integer-valued randoms. Given a set S ≥ T 0
′ which is c.e. in 0 ′ we show how to construct an integer-valued random set A of c.e. degree such that A ′ ≡ T S . Along with A, we build a c.e. set B such that A ≡ T B, and show that B ′ ≡ T S . Let m e be an effective enumeration of all partial computable integer-valued martingales. So that A is integer-valued random, we meet the requirements R e : If m e is total, then m e does not succeed on A. We also build wtt-reductions Γ and ∆ such that Γ B = A and ∆ A = B. For the requirement S T B ′ , we build a functional Λ and meet the requirements P e : lim t Λ B (e, t) = S (e).
The basic strategy for a P-requirement is as follows. As S is c.e. in and above 0 ′ , we know that S is Σ 0 2 . Therefore there is some computable approximation {S i } i∈ω such that n ∈ S if and only if there is an s such that n ∈ S t for all t > s. We define Λ B (e, s) = 1 for larger and larger s with some large use λ(e, s). If we see at some stage u that e S u and u > t, then we enumerate λ(e, t) into B and redefine Λ B (e, t) = 0 with use −1, i.e. the axiom defining Although we will not actually meet these requirements (doing so would mean that B ′ ≡ T ∅ ′ ), trying to meet the requirements will allow us to show that B ′ T S . 4.2.1. The priority tree. The construction will use a tree of strategies. To define the tree, we specify recursively the association of nodes to requirements, and specify the outcomes of nodes working for particular requirements. To specify the priority ordering of nodes, we specify the ordering between outcomes of any node. We order the requirements as R 0 > P 0 > N 0 > R 1 > P 1 > N 1 > · · · and specify that all nodes of length k work for the k th requirement on the list. We will have nodes dedicated to R-, P-, and N-requirements. A node dedicated to a P-requirement will have the ∞ outcome, corresponding to enumerating infinitely many markers λ(e, s), and the f outcome, for when only finitely many markers are enumerated. Suppose that the node α works for P e and β works for N f with α ≺ β. If f is the true outcome of α and αˆf β, then only finitely many markers are enumerated, and β does not need to worry about the computations it sees being destroyed infinitely many times. Now suppose that ∞ is the true outcome of α and αˆ∞ β. Then β will be guessing that P e will enumerate all its unrestrained markers λ(e, s) into B. It will then not believe a computation Φ 
Making the sets A, B of the same degree.
In Section 4.1 we discussed the proof that there is a low c.e. degree containing an integer-valued random set. As in that argument, we make use of levels in the definition of the reductions Γ and ∆. We slightly adjust the definition of the levels because we now must also enumerate the markers λ(e, s) into B. We increase the size of each interval [d i , d i+1 ) to accommodate a coding marker. The coding markers will be chosen to be d i for some i ∈ ω. Now that we are also enumerating coding markers into B, we also adjust the definition of the levels l i . Enumerating the coding markers will cause more strings to become forbidden. We recalculate the upper bound on the number of forbidden strings of length l i+1 . As before, the requirements R 0 , . . . , R i may act at level l i+1 . We calculated in Section 4.1 that we may act at most (i + 2)! many times at level l i+1 . When the coding marker d i is enumerated, the requirements R 0 , . . . , R i may act again at level l i+1 . Therefore we may act at most 2(i + 2)! + 1 many times at level l i+1 . So there are at most + 1)! + 1) , we calculate the levels l i as before. We let l 0 = 0, and given l i , we let l i+1,0 = l i + (µn)(2 n f ′ i+1 ) and for 0 j i we let
4.2.3. Coordination and restraint on the tree. The action for R-requirements will otherwise be identical with the construction of Section 4.1. Nodes working for R-requirements will also have to be wary of coding done by Pnodes above. Suppose β, working for R f , is below the ∞ outcome of α, which is working for P e . 
We say that a computation Φ Step 1: For e, t s, if Λ B (e, t) is undefined at stage s, then let Λ B (e, t) = 1 with some fresh large use λ(e, t) equal to d i for some i ∈ ω.
Step 2: We let the collection of accessible nodes δ s be an initial segment of the tree of strategies. Let σ be a node which is accessible at stage s. We describe the action that σ takes, and if |σ| < s, then we specify which immediate successor of σ is also accessible at stage s; otherwise, we proceed to the next stage.
Suppose first that σ works for R e . Let k be least such that d k r(σ, s). If
(1) for all P-nodes α such that αˆ∞ σ, r(α, s) < λ(e, t) < d k =⇒ λ(e, t) ∈ B s , and (2) there is l > l k+1 , r e,s such that (a) m e,s (σ) ↓ for all strings σ of length l, and (4.1) The leftmost path which is visited infinitely often exists.
As there are only finitely many outcomes of a P-node, we need to verify that the restraint imposed by an N-or R-node comes to a limit. Let σ work for R e , and suppose by induction that no node to the left of σ is visited after stage s 0 , and that lim s r(σ, s) exists. We must have r(σ, s) = r(σ, s 0 ) and r e,s = r e,s 0 for all s s 0 . Let k be such that d k r(σ, s 0 ). Whenever we act for R e at level l i for i k + 1, m e 's capital decreases by at least $1 and we increase restrains for all R-requirements of weaker priority. The only elements which may be enumerated below the restraints R e places on B are coding markers belonging to P-requirements stronger than R e . However, if R e is below the ∞ outcome of P e , then R e waits until all unrestrained markers below d i enter B before acting at level l i+1 . Therefore the only markers which enter below R e 's restraint belong to those P-requirements with σ below the f outcome. By induction, we do not visit any node to the left of σ after stage s 0 , and so no such strategy may act after stage s 0 and enumerate a coding marker below R e 's restraint. Therefore we act for R e only finitely many times after stage s 0 . Similarly, as we require the computations N-nodes observe to be σ-correct, if σ works for N e and is on the true path, it will increase its restraints only finitely many times. This concludes the proof of (4.1).
Let the true path, TP, be the leftmost path visited infinitely often. The proof of (4.1) shows that we act only finitely often for any R-requirement. Therefore m e (A) < ∞ and R e is satisfied for all e ∈ ω. Therefore First use S to compute S ↾ e. For i < e, if S (i) = 1 then we will want to eventually stop enumerating markers λ(i, s). If S (i) = 0, then we will want to enumerate all unrestrained markers. Suppose we see a computation Φ B e (e)[t] ↓. We find the markers λ(i, s) below ϕ B e (e)[t] for i < e. As we know the fate of every marker below the use, we can computably determine whether this computation is B-correct, that is, whether B will change below the use after stage t. Therefore equation (1) 
Degrees of left-c.e. partial integer-valued randoms.
Here we show that every left-c.e. real that is integervalued random is Turing (and in fact, weak truth table) equivalent to a partial integer-valued random left-c.e. real. Hence along with the argument of the previous section, it proves Theorem 1.6. In order to make the argument more concise, we will often refer to the argument of Section 4.1, which uses a similar machinery. Given a left-c.e. integer-valued random set A we will construct a partial integer-valued random set B such that A ≡ wtt B. Suppose we are given A with a computable approximation A s . Let ϕ e be an effective enumeration of all partial computable integer-valued martingales. We build a set B and weak truth-table reductions Γ and ∆ such that Γ A = B and ∆ B = A to meet the requirements R e : ϕ e does not succeed on B.
We also build for each e ∈ ω a partial integer-valued martingale m e . In the case that ϕ e is defined along B, m e will be total. = n for all n. We observe the values of ϕ 0 along B. First we wait to see ϕ 0 (λ). If we later see ϕ 0 increase its capital along B, then we will wish to change B to force ϕ 0 to lose capital. We will need permission from A to do so. We put pressure on A to change by defining the martingale m 0 . If ϕ 0 increases its capital on B s by betting on B s ↾ n, then we define m 0 to start with capital ϕ 0 (λ), place the same bets as ϕ 0 [s] along B s ↾ n, and bet neutrally on all other strings up to length n. We repeat this every time we see ϕ 0 increase its capital along B until we see a change in A. As A is integer-valued random, m 0 (A) < ∞ and so A must eventually move. This gives us a permission to change B.
Suppose ω . The partial martingale ϕ 0 might not be defined on any string extending B s ↾ m, whereas m 0 has been defined to be neutral on all initial segments of B s of length between m and d. Later ϕ 0 might increase its capital along these strings, and we would not be able to define m 0 to directly copy its bets. We can however raise the use γ(m)[s] to be large. At stage s we let γ(m)[s] = 2d. If ϕ 0 then bets along initial segments of B of length between m and d, we copy the wagers that ϕ 0 makes on these strings by placing the same wagers along the initial segments of A of length between d and 2d. We are then still putting pressure on A to change. If A changes below 2d we can then change B below d and force ϕ 0 to lose money.
Multiple requirements.
The interaction between multiple requirements will cause difficulty in coding. We use levels l i and d i in order to facilitate the coding. We set γ(l i ) = d i and δ(d i ) = l i+1 and let l 1 = 5 (the choice of l 1 is not significant). We attempt to change B above a string of length l for l ∈ (l i , l i+1 ] only for the sake of the requirements R 0 , . . . , R i .
We will attempt to change B below l 1 only for the sake of decreasing ϕ 0 's capital along B ↾ l 1 . We would like γ(l 1 ) to be large enough so that we can copy all the wagers that ϕ 0 may place along strings of length l 1 . There are 2 l 1 many such strings, and so if we set d 1 = γ(l 1 ) = 2 l 1 .l 1 , this will certainly be large enough. As A is left-c.e., A can change below d 1 at most 2 d 1 many times. Therefore there are at most 2 d 1 many forbidden strings. To calculate l 2 , we begin by setting l 2,0 = l 1 + (µx)(2
We act at level l 2 for the sake of R 0 and R 1 . The action for these requirements can again move us closer to forbidden strings. The distance we can be moved, is given in terms of the function d which is introduced in the argument of Section 4.1. Therefore we define l 2,1 , l 2,2 and l 2 as before.
Suppose A changes below d 1 at stage s. Then we are free to change B below l 1 . We choose a string τ of length l 1 which minimises m 0 ; if there is no reason to move, we do not move. In either case, we then choose some string ρ of length l 2 extending the current version of B ↾ l 1 which has not been visited before, and let B s+1 = ρ1 ω . We change B below l 2 for the sake of requirements R 0 and R 1 . We define the total martingale m 0 to copy the wagers that ϕ 0 places on B ↾ l 2 , and we define the total martingale m 1 to copy the wagers that ϕ 1 places on B ↾ l 2 . We require d 2 to be large enough so that m 0 can copy all the wagers that ϕ 0 may place along strings of length l 2 beneath d 2 , and m 1 can copy all the wagers that ϕ 1 may place along strings of length l 2 beneath d 2 . Therefore, by the same reasoning as the calculation of d 1 , we would like d 2 to be at least 2 l 2 .l 2 . We then define l 3 similarly, with l 3,0 = l 2 + d 2 , and l 3,1 , l 3,2 , l 3,3 and l 3 as in the argument of Section 4.1. Now suppose that A changes between d 1 and d 2 at stage s
We cannot change B below l 1 , but we can change B above l 1 . We therefore choose a string τ of length l 2 which minimises the martingales ϕ 0 and ϕ 1 . As R 0 has stronger priority than R 1 , we first look to minimise ϕ 0 . If we can, we change B to minimise ϕ 0 , and if we cannot, we then look to minimise ϕ 1 . If we can, we change B to minimise ϕ 1 , and if we cannot, we do not change B. In any case, we then choose some string ρ of length l 3 extending the current version of B ↾ l 2 which has not been visited before, and let B s ′ +1 = ρ1 ω .
4.3.3. Construction. For every e ∈ ω and at every stage s we have a restraint r e,s . During the construction we will say that "m e has copied ϕ e 's wager on σ" for some e and string σ. 
and let l i+1 = l i+1,i+1 + 1. Set γ(l i ) = d i and δ(d i ) = l i+1 for all i. At stage 0, we set B 1 = 1 ω , m e (λ) = ϕ e (λ) for all e, and r e,1 = l e for all e. At stage s > 0 do the following:
Case 1: there is l r e,s such that ϕ e (B s ↾ (l + 1)) > ϕ e (B s ↾ l), m e has copied ϕ e 's wagers on B s ↾ 1, . . . , B s ↾ l, and m e has not already copied ϕ e 's wager on B s ↾ (l + 1). Let e be the least applicable, and l the least applicable for this e. Define m e to wager ϕ e (B s It remains to show that for all e ∈ ω, R e is satisfied. Suppose by induction that all requirements of stronger priority than R e do not act after stage s * . We show that if ϕ e succeeds on B, then m e succeeds on A, which is a contradiction to A being integer-valued random.
Let i 0 be least such that l i 0 r e,s * . By the restraints imposed, we cannot change B below l i 0 for the sake of R e . Now suppose that at stage s s * we see ϕ e,s (B s ↾ l) > ϕ e,s (B s ↾ l i 0 ). Let l be the least applicable, and suppose i is such that l ∈ (l i , l i+1 ]. From stage s we have m e copy ϕ e 's wagers, and at some stage s ′ s we define m e to wager
If m e copies all of the wagers that ϕ e makes on strings of length less than or equal to l−1, then m e is defined on strings of length at most 2
Then we will choose a string τ of length l i+1 extending B t ↾ l i with max j l i+1 ϕ e,t (τ ↾ j) < ϕ e,t (B s ↾ l). Taking the contrapositive, we see that if ϕ e makes capital on B past l i 0 , then m e makes capital on A. Therefore if ϕ e succeeds on B then m e succeeds on A.
Computably enumerable degrees not containing integer-valued randoms
It is hardly surprising that there are c.e. degrees which do not contain integer-valued randoms. After all, computable enumerability hinders randomness, and indeed with respect to a sufficient level of randomness, c.e. sets are not random. However integer-valued randomness is sufficiently weak so that it has interesting interactions with computable enumerability. In this section we look at the question of which c.e. degrees do not contain integervalued randoms. The first example of such degrees was given in Section 3.2 where we showed Theorem 1.7. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that there are c.e. degrees which are not array computable (so, by Corollary 1.5 they compute an integer-valued random) yet they do not contain integer-valued randoms. We prove this in Section 5.1, and extend it to a much stronger result (namely Theorem 1.8) in Section 5.2. 5.1. C.e. array noncomputable degrees not containing integer-valued randoms. We wish to construct an array noncomputable c.e. degree not containing an integer-valued random set. Let (Γ e , ∆ e ) e∈ω be an effective listing of all pairs of Turing functionals, and let D n be the very strong array with Figure 3 . A visualization of the reductions in requirement N e
We build for each e ∈ ω an integer-valued martingale m e , and replace the requirement N e with the following requirements N e,k for all k 2:
A e e = B =⇒ m e wins at least k dollars on A e . We effectively order the requirements, making sure that if k < k ′ , then N e,k has stronger priority than N e,k ′ . We say that R e requires attention at stage s if , s) ) [s] . Define m e to wager $1 on τ, and bet neutrally on all other strings with length in (d e,s , |τ|] . Remove the followers of R-requirements of weaker priority than N e,k .
Verification. It remains to show that each requirement requires attention only finitely often, and is met. Assume by induction that all requirements of stronger priority than R e do not require attention after stage s. If R e does not have a follower at stage s then it will be appointed one. This follower cannot be cancelled as requirements of stronger priority can no longer act. Suppose that R e has follower i at stage s. If we ever see that B t ∩ D i W e,t ∩ D i then we will enumerate W e,t ∩ D i into B. As |D i | = i + 1, R e can require attention at most i + 1 many times after stage s. Then we will have B ∩ D i = W e ∩ D i and R e is satisfied.
We claim that for all e, if ∆ B e = A e and Γ
A e e = B, then m e is nondecreasing along A e . Suppose we have m e (σ) = k − 1 for some string σ. Suppose N e,k requires attention at stage t and we define m e (τ) = k. We remove the followers for R-requirements of weaker priority, and so only requirements of stronger priority than N e,k can 
. R-requirements of stronger priority have finished acting, and so no numbers less than r e,k,t enter B after stage t. We remove the followers for R-requirements of weaker priority. When they are appointed new followers they will choose fresh numbers, and so all enumerations into B after stage t will be larger than δ e (γ e (l(e, t)) [t] . As B cannot change below δ e (γ e (l(e, t))) [t] , A e = ∆ B e cannot change below γ e (l(e, t)) [t] . Therefore τ ≺ A e and m e (A e ↾ γ e (l(e, t))[t]) = k. By the previous claim, m e (A e ) k, and N e,k is satisfied.
5.2.
A high 2 c.e. degree not containing integer-valued randoms. In this section we prove Theorem 1.8. Nies, Stephan and Terwijn showed that every high degree contains a computably random set, and so a fortiori, an integervalued random set. It is instructive though to see why we cannot build a high degree that does not contain an integer-valued random set. This will give us some insight as to why the construction works when we only require our set to be high 2 . So that the degree of A does not contain an integer-valued random set, we meet the requirements where m e is an integer-valued martingale we build for the sake of N e . Suppose that the martingale m e has won $k − 1 on ∆ A e ↾ n. The basic strategy to win another dollar is to first pick a large location marker p. we must impose restraint on A. The problem is that the strategies for N e may gang up and impose restraint on all markers λ(x, s); every time a marker is defined we may define m e and impose restraint, and never allow the marker to be enumerated. If Tot(x) = 1 we will never be able to correct Λ A (x, s) to be 1 and the limit will be incorrect. Another approach we might take would be to capriciously enumerate the markers which occur below δ e (γ e (l(e))[s]. If we do this and always have some marker below the use, we will be able to conclude that Γ ∆ A e e A (this argument is given in full in the verification below). However, the problem now is that we might not have wanted to enumerate the markers. If Tot(x) = 0 and we capriciously enumerate all markers λ(x, s) and redefine Λ A (x, s) to be 1, the limit will be incorrect.
To make A high 2 , we need to instead define a functional Λ such that
where Cof = {x | W x is cofinite} is the canonical Σ 0 3 -complete set. The double limit means that we may be wrong on a finite number of the m while still satisfying the requirement. This will allow us to employ the capricious enumeration strategy successfully. We have the requirements
as well as the N e from above. The construction will use a priority tree. For each global requirement N e we have several nodes devoted to meeting N e , each equipped with a guess as to the outcomes of stronger priority requirements. Such a node will be called a mother node devoted to N e . Each such node τ builds its own martingale m τ . We argue in the verification that for every e ∈ ω there is some node τ such that m τ succeeds on ∆ A e . For each subrequirement N e,k we have several nodes devoted to meeting N e,k . Such a node will be called a worker node devoted to N e,k , and will occur below a mother node τ devoted to N e . For the longest such τ, we say that σ's mother node is τ. When we reach a node σ devoted to N e,k , we choose a fresh location marker p for σ, and place a link from σ back up to τ. The link can be seen as testing the hypothesis of N e . The length of agreement between A and Γ ∆ A e e will be measured at τ. When we next arrive at τ and see the length of agreement computations converge, this further confirms the hypothesis of N e . We travel the link to σ, define more of the martingale m τ , and then remove the link.
The requirement H x will have nodes β x,m for m ∈ ω. The node β x,m tests whether [m, ∞) ⊆ W x . Note that this is a Π 2 test. Such a node will have outcomes ∞, which corresponds to the Π 2 test infinitely often looking correct, and f , corresponding to the finite outcome. The β x,m nodes will be responsible for defining Λ A (x, m, t) for each t. As we do not know the true path in advance, each path through the priority tree will have a β x,m node, which collectively will define Λ A (x, m, t) for all t. It is important to note that the markers λ(x, m, s) are shared by all the β x,m nodes. Whether we succeed in enumerating the markers and updating Λ as needed will depend on how the construction proceeds.
We will now describe how these requirements interact and what modifications we need to make to the priority tree as a consequence. First we consider the situation where we have H x of lower priority than N e (which is associated with the mother node τ). The problem is the following. Suppose we have a situation with nodes τ ≺ β x,m ≺ σ where σ is devoted to N e,k and τ is σ's mother node. That is, while σ has higher global priority than β x,m , its local priority is lower. Suppose at some stage σ picks a location marker p(σ) and creates a link back to τ at stage s 0 . At a later stage s 1 we get to τ, see the necessary computations converge, and would like to travel the link and define the martingale. This causes no problem if σ β x,mˆf , but there are problems if σ β x,mˆ∞ . We will require the computations l(τ) [s] to be τ-correct; that is, all guesses τ makes about the enumeration of markers below δ e (γ e (l(e)))[s] have already occurred.
The trouble is that at stage s 1 there now might be some marker λ = λ(x, m, q) which is greater than p(σ), but below the use of l(τ)[s 1 ]. We may not yet want to enumerate λ into A because the Σ 2 outcome may now be looking correct at β x,m (that is, we might think Cof(x) = 0). If we did define the martingale, since β x,m has higher priority than σ, any restraint imposed at s 1 may not be successful since β x,m might later put λ into A. This could potentially cause our martingale m τ to lose all its capital, and it could never bet again.
The solution to this problem is as follows. When we hit τ, if there is some link to a node σ and there is some λ as above, we immediately enumerate any λ below the use of l(τ) [s] into A, but we do not define the martingale. This means that β x,m cannot later use λ to make m τ lose capital. If there is no such λ then we do define the martingale, since we can be sure that σ is satisfied provided that it is on the true path. This is the situation we would like, but failing that, we would like to get a global win on N e . In the case that such a λ exists, we travel the link from τ to σ, enumerate all applicable markers, but we do not delete the link. Because of this, we need to add a new outcome to σ. Therefore σ will have outcomes g and d. The outcome g will be played when we perform the capricious enumeration of λ as above. The outcome d will be played when we define the martingale. Suppose we have some worker node σ with location marker p(σ) which always has some λ below the use of l(τ) [s] . We will then define Λ A (x, m, t) to have limit 1 for any pair (x, m) such that τ ≺ β x,m ≺ σ; note that there are only finitely many pairs (x, m). We will also have a link from τ to σ for almost all stages. This corresponds, however, to a global win on N e , since p(σ) is a witness to the fact that δ e (γ e (l(e)) does not exist and so Γ A. The permanent link may cause us to skip over other mother nodes, which would mean we cannot meet their requirements. We therefore restart all N-requirements of weaker priority than N e under the g outcome of σ. We do this by assigning the requirements N e ′ for e ′ > e, as well as their subrequirements N e ′ ,k for k ∈ ω, to nodes below σˆg in some fair way. We do not restart any β nodes, since Λ A (x, m, t) will be defined to be 1 for the finitely many x and m with τ ≺ β x,m ≺ σ. This will mean that for a finite number of m, lim t Λ A (x, m, t) may be incorrectly outputting 1 instead of 0. This is fine though, since we will only lose on a finite number of the m and still can satisfy H x . The sacrifice of losing on an m will only be made when we can ensure a global win on a τ node of stronger priority.
We now come to the situation where we have an H x of higher global priority than the N e associated with τ. We now cannot allow τ to capriciously enumerate all the markers belonging to β x,m if f is β x,m 's true outcome. We now describe our solution to this problem.
First suppose that β x,m and β x,n are worker nodes devoted to H x with m < n. If β x,n occurs below β x,mˆ∞ , then β x,n is guessing that [m, ∞) ⊆ W x . Therefore β x,n must also be guessing that [n, ∞) ⊆ W x as n > m, and so β x,n will have only the ∞ outcome.
Suppose that τ is below the f outcome of any β x,m node with m < n. We will restart τ below β x,nˆ∞ . Consider the situation β x,nˆ∞ τ ≺ β x,n ′ ≺ σ with n ′ > n. If there is a link from τ to σ then capriciously enumerating the markers λ(x, n ′ , t) into A will not injure β x,n ′ since this is what β x,n ′ would like to do anyway. Therefore H x cannot be injured in this situation. We show in Lemma 5.1 that such a τ can be restarted only finitely many times.
There is one last problem. Suppose we have τ ≺ β x,m ≺ σ with a link (τ, σ). As σ's mother is above β x,m , we must have β x,mˆf σ. If the link is permanent then β x,m will not be able to enumerate its markers. As H x has higher global priority than N e , this is not a situation we want. We employ the following technique from DowneyStob [DS97] . When we hit τ, we realize that if there is a link from τ down then this may be a potentially permanent link. We first perform a scouting report to see where we would go if there were no link around. If we were to go to a node γ to the left of σ then we will erase the link and actually go to γ instead. This ensures that if β x,mˆ∞ is β x,m 's true outcome, then it will be able to enumerate its markers.
The Priority Tree. Our priority tree, PT, will have three types of nodes. The first type are mother nodes τ, which have outcomes ∞ and f , and will be assigned to some global requirement N e . We write e(τ) = e. The next type are worker nodes σ which are devoted to a subrequirement of some N e , and hence will be assigned some e, k. We write e(σ) = e, k(σ) = k. We form the tree so that such σ occur below some τ with e(τ) = e. For the longest such τ with e(τ) = e, we will write τ(σ) = τ. This is to indicate that τ is σ's mother. σ has outcomes g and d with g < d. Finally we have nodes β which are devoted to some H x , and hence will be assigned some x, m. We write x(β) = x, m(β) = m, or simply β x,m . β will have outcomes ∞ and f , with ∞ < f , unless β occurs below β ′ˆ∞ for some β ′ with x(β ′ ) = x(β), in which case β has only the single outcome ∞. We now assign requirements and subrequirements to nodes on the tree. In a basic infinite injury argument we would have all nodes of the same level working for the same requirement. However in our case, as we must restart τ nodes, it is more complicated. We use lists of, for example, Soare [Soa87, Chapter XIV] for this. We will have three lists, L 0 , L 1 , and L 2 , which keep track of indices for τ, σ and β nodes, respectively. n = 0. Let λ be devoted to N 0 , and let
For n > 0, let γ ∈ PT be of the form δˆa. Adopt the first case below to pertain, letting
Case 2a. a = g. Define the lists as in Case 1a.
and let L 1 (γ) be the union of L 0 (δ) with
Having defined the lists, we now assign requirements to nodes of the priority tree as follows. Let γ ∈ PT and i be the least element of
and i = e, k , let γ be a worker node devoted to N e,k . Otherwise i = x, m ∈ L 2 (γ) and we let γ be worker node devoted to H x with m(γ) = m.
Lemma 5.1 (Finite injury along any path lemma). For every path h ∈ [PT ]
and every e, k ∈ ω,
Proof.
(1) and (3) are standard. For (2), a node τ devoted to N e is restarted below βˆ∞ if x(β) < e and τ has been below only the f outcomes of nodes devoted to H x . Once restarted, it can no longer be restarted below any other β ′ with x(β ′ ) = x(β). Thus τ is restarted finitely many times.
The construction below will proceed in substages. We will append a subscript t to a parameter G, so that G t denotes the value of G at substage t of the construction. As usual all parameters hold their value unless they are initialized. When initialization occurs they become undefined, or are set to zero as the case may be. We will append a parameter [s], when necessary, to denote stage s. We may write (s, t) to denote substage t of stage s.
If we visit a node ν at stage (s, t) we will say that (s, t) is a genuine ν-stage. It might be that we do not visit ν at stage (s, t), rather we visit some ν ′ extending ν. In this case we say that (s, t) is a ν-stage, and hence a ν-stage may not be genuine. In fact, should we put in place some permanent link (τ, σ) with τ ≺ ν ≺ σ, then ν might only ever be visited finitely often. However, this is when σˆg is the true outcome for some higher priority τ, and we would claim that a new version of ν would live below outcome g of σ. We will eventually define the genuine true path as those nodes that are on the leftmost path visited infinitely often, and for which there are infinitely many genuine stages.
We have for each node on the priority tree γ and for all x, m ∈ ω a restraint c γ (x, m). These restraints will be initially set to zero in the construction, and will only be increased when γ is a mother node devoted to some N e . We say that a computation
. If τ is a mother node devoted to N e , then let
For τ a mother node devoted to some Substage t + 1 s + 1. We will be given a string γ = TP[s + 1] t . Adopt the first case to pertain below.
Case 1. γ is a mother node devoted to N e . Subcase 1a. There is a link (γ, σ) for some node σ. We perform the scouting report by computing the string γ Verification. We define TP, the true path, to be the leftmost path visited infinitely often. This clearly exists as the priority tree is finite-branching. We define GTP, the genuine true path, to be those α ≺ TP such that there are infinitely many genuine α-stages.
Lemma 5.2. For every e ∈ ω there is a node τ devoted to N e on GTP.
Proof. Let τ be the longest node devoted to N e on TP, which exists by the finite injury along any path lemma. We claim that τ is on GTP. Suppose otherwise. Then it must be the case that there are τ ′ and σ on GTP such that τ ′ ≺ τ ≺ σ and the link (τ ′ , σ) is there at almost all stages. This implies that σˆg is on GTP. On the priority tree, if τ 1 ≺ τ 2 then e(τ 1 ) < e(τ 2 ). Now as σ links to its mother node τ ′ and τ ′ ≺ τ we must have e(τ ′ ) < e(τ) = e. But then by the construction of the priority tree, there is an N e node below σˆg, contradicting the hypothesis that τ is the longest such. [s] A ↾ a 1 . However if this were the case, at the next genuine τ-stage greater than s we will see that these computations have converged, play the d outcome, and remove the link. This contradicts the fact that the link is permanent. This establishes the claim. Now suppose there is no such permanent link. We will show that m τ succeeds on ∆ A e . We must ensure that m τ 's capital does not decrease along ∆ A e . Fix k ∈ ω, and let σ ′ ≻ τ be the first node devoted to N e,k that is visited. Suppose we visit σ ′ first at stage s 0 . At stage s 0 we assign σ ′ a fresh large location marker p(σ ′ ) and link back to τ. Let s 1 be the stage at which we first define m τ to win $k on ∆ A e [s 0 ]. As we acted in case (2b) of the construction, we did not play the g outcome at stage s 1 and so there were no markers belonging to any nodes β such that τ ≺ βˆ∞ σ ′ below the use of our computations. The computations are τ-correct at stage s 1 and restraint is imposed on requirements of weaker priority than σ ′ . Therefore the only markers which can be enumerated below the use are those belonging to nodes β such that τ ≺ βˆf σ ′ . As βˆf was visited at stage s 0 , there is at least one marker, namely λ(x, m, s 0 ) where x = x(β) and m = m(β), that has not been enumerated into A by stage s 0 . The location marker p(σ ′ ) was chosen to be large at the substage when σ ′ was visited, and so is larger than λ(x, m, s 0 ). create a link (τ, σ) . Let s 2 be the stage at which we travel the link to σ and define m τ to win $k on ∆ A e [s 2 ]. If we visit a node that is below τ but to the left of σ then, as in the previous paragraph, m τ will then have capital k − 1. However σ ≺ TP, and so this will occur only finitely many times. Let s 3 be the greatest stage at which σ is initialized. We remove any link over σ as part of the initalization. At the next σ-stage after s 3 we will genuinely visit σ and place a link if we see that m τ (∆ Thus we must show that we eventually stop enumerating the markers λ(x, m, t) into A. As [m 0 , ∞) W x , the Π 2 test which measures whether [m, ∞) ⊆ W x will eventually always say "no". So eventually the β x,m nodes will stop putting their markers into A and redefining Λ A (x, m, t). Therefore the only way we will enumerate the markers is if there is a link (τ, σ) over β x,m with τ ≺ β x,mˆ∞ σ and τ is accessible. We must show that if there is such a link then τ is accessible at only finitely many stages.
For τ with e(τ) > x, we will restart τ below β x,mˆ∞ . If βˆ∞ τ ≺ β x,m 1 σ and a link (τ, σ) is placed over β x,m 1 for some m 1 > m, then as βˆ∞ can be visited at most finitely many times, only finitely many markers λ(x, m 1 , t) will be enumerated. Now suppose τ is above β and we place a link (τ, σ) over β. Subcase (2a) of the construction will enumerate markers λ(x, m, t) only if β x,mˆ∞ σ. As σ must be below βˆf , the markers λ(x, m, t) will not be enumerated, and we will have lim t Λ A (x, m, t) = 0. Finally, if β ′ x,m is another node on another path of the priority tree which is visited infinitely often, we must ensure that it does not enumerate all of the markers λ(x, m, t). The Π 2 test performed at β ′ x,m is the same test which is performed at β x,m and so will eventually always say "no". Therefore the marker λ(x, m, t) will only be enumerated if there is a link (τ, σ) over β Let σ 0 be the node on TP devoted to N e ′ ,k ′ , and suppose that no node to the left of σ 0 is visited after stage s 0 . When we genuinely visit any node σ σ 0 with mother node τ, the construction will check to see whether m τ (∆ then we will create a link from σ back to τ at stage s > s 0 . If the link is permanent then c τ (x, m) will never be increased. If we later define more of m τ we will then increase c τ (x, m). Again, as σ ≺ TP, the martingale will never decrease in capital and c τ (x, m) cannot be increased again after travelling a link to some σ ′ devoted to N e,k(σ) . There are only finitely many worker nodes σ σ 0 with mother node τ. Therefore lim s c τ (x, m) [s] exists for all τ β.
We will restart all τ nodes with e(τ) > x below β x,m ′ˆ∞. As [m ′ , ∞) ⊆ W x , the Π 2 test which measures whether [m, ∞) ⊆ W x will say "yes" infinitely many times for all m m ′ . If a link (τ, σ) is placed over β x,m ′ , and so β x,m ′ˆf σ, we will perform a scouting report when we arrive at τ. Suppose the link (τ, σ) is placed at stage s 0 and that s 1 is the least stage greater than s 0 at which the Π 2 test says "yes". At the least τ-stage after s 1 , the scouting report will be successful, and β x,m ′ˆ∞ will be accessible. We then will remove the link (τ, σ) and enumerate the marker λ(x, m ′ , t). In this way all of β x,m ′ 's markers will eventually be enumerated. Now suppose that β x,m ′ˆ∞ τ ≺ β x,m 1 ≺ σ. The node β x,m 1 has only the ∞ outcome, as it is below β x,m ′ˆ∞ with m ′ < m 1 . If β x,m 1 is on GTP then it will enumerate its markers whenever it is accessible and define Λ such that lim t Λ
A (x, m 1 , t) = 1. If β x,m 1 is not on GTP then the link (τ, σ) must be permanent. As in the previous paragraph, β x,m ′ˆ∞ will be accessible at infinitely many stages. When we arrive at τ and see the link, we will enumerate markers of the form λ(x, m 1 , q). Therefore all of β x,m 1 's markers will eventually be enumerated and lim t Λ
A (x, m 1 , t) = 1.
This concludes the verification of the construction, and the proof of Theorem 1.8.
